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1.1 INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
Intrusion Detection is now a significant component of any security system. The 
purpose of an intrusion detection system (or IDS) is to detect unauthorized access or 
misuse against a computer system. Intrusion detection systems serve as burglar alarms for 
computer systems and networks. They sound alarms and sometimes even take corrective 
action when an intruder or abuser is detected. If a Masquerader or Hacker can gain access 
and use your internet access, then they can use your machine to launch other attacks on 
other computers while keeping themselves well hidden. For example, there are certain 
applications that take days to months to run a series of processes on even the fastest 
computer. If a Masquerader can gain access to 1000 computers and utilize their combined 
processing power, a process that would take a month on a single computer could 
complete the operation in less than an hour. 
 These Intruders or Masqueraders could be anyone, they could be kids who use their 
parent’s company account in spite of the company policy or people just playing jokes on 
other users or they could be malicious intruders intentionally trying to hide their identity 
by impersonating other users, such types of masqueraders are considered to be Insiders. 
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There are some intruders from the outside who immediately try to gain access through a 
valid user and they can be very dangerous. According to a survey, most of the financial 
damages were caused by the Insider and not by the Outsider [8]. Moreover, it was 
estimated that about one thirds of the total damages were caused by the Insider. 
 
1.2 MASQUERADE DETECTION 
 A Masquerader or an Intruder behaves way different from the Proper User. Most of 
the well known methods in Computer Intrusion Detection fall under two broad categories 
and they are 1) Pattern Recognition or Misuse and 2) Anomaly Intrusion Detection. The 
art of recognizing intrusion patterns from the previously observed intrusions is known as 
pattern recognition. Most of the researchers consider it to be the first line of defense. 
Apparently it is the most powerful technique when the intrusion method is known. Illegal 
User behavior is generally difficult to comprehend because they can be a lot of ways in 
which an Illegal User could intrude. Moreover, Hackers or Masqueraders come up with 
novel strategies of attack and hence pattern recognition would not be very effective in 
stopping the intrusion.   
 A proper User behavior can always be recorded and any behavior that deviates from 
the proper behavior is considered to be Intrusive. Hence this type of Detection is named 
as Anomaly Detection System. Anomaly detection techniques can be very useful with 
novel attacks and in fact, these techniques need some amount of statistical information to 
3
support themselves. In Anomaly detection techniques, a profile of the valid user is built 
and any behavior that does deviate from the profile is considered to be intrusive. Hence 
Anomaly Detection is the most appropriate method of detection. Some of the categories 
of intrusion attacks are eavesdropping and packet sniffing (passive interception of 
network traffic), snooping and downloading, tampering or data diddling (unauthorized 
changes to data or records), spoofing (impersonating other users, e.g. by forging the 
originating email address, or by gaining password access), jamming or flooding 
(overwhelming a system’s resources, e.g. by an email flood), injecting malicious code 
(via floppy disks, email attachments, etc.), exploiting design or implementation flaws 
(often buffer overflows; overflows overwrite other data and can be used to get control 
over a system) and, cracking passwords and keys.   
 Previous approaches have used the dataset studied and presented by Schonlau [2]. 
This dataset had only on parametric field in it namely the “command”. In this thesis, we 
propose a novel approach to masquerader detection based on command and CPU Time. 
Following this introduction, is Section II that explains the Users dataset used in our thesis 
and the UNIX commands used to generate the dataset. Section III gives a brief overview 
of different methods used by previous researchers for Masquerader Detection System. 
Section IV discusses the Online and the Offline Naïve Bayes Classifier and our 
methodology to increase the accuracy of the system. Section V summarizes the main 






2.1.1 Hit rate 
 The Naïve Bayes Algorithm is a learning technique which detects Masqueraders 
having an Illegal entry to the system. Hit rate is the rate at which the Algorithm correctly 
identifies proper users and Masqueraders.    
 
2.1.2 False Alarm Rate 
 False Alarm Rate, in other words, would be how incorrectly the algorithm has 
detected. There might be a lot of alarms even with proper or valid user.  
 
2.1.3 Missing Alarm rate 
 Sometimes the Naïve Bayes Algorithm would not produce a good accuracy rate and 
hence it might not produce an alarm for a masquerader. This detection rate is called the 
Missing-Alarm-Rate.
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2.2 OVERVIEW OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
 Simulating real-time IDS (Intrusion Detection System) is a huge task and we require 
a detailed study of different components involved. Many researchers have been trying to 
study these components and have succeeded in reducing the High False Alarm Rate. 
Schonlau [2] and his colleagues presented the dataset in full detail and reviewed six 
techniques to analyze User command log files. They reported a high of 70% hit rate and 
6.7% false alarm rate. Maxion and Townsend [1] later achieved better results by using 
Naïve Bayes classifier which recorded a hit rate of 61% and a false alarm rate of 1.3%. 
Also Yung [7], proposed a Self-consistent Naïve Bayes classifier which resulted in a low 
missing alarm rate of 40% and a false alarm rate of 1.3%. 
 
2.3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
Schonlau [2] used keyboard command data from 50 users and these fifty user 
datasets were injected with data from outside the community of 50. Hence the data from 
outside is considered to be the intrusive data. Each user data file consisted of 15,000 
commands, within which the first 5000 were considered to be the Truth or considered as 
legal commands while the rest of the commands have been formed with the injection of 
commands from users outside the community of 50. Their objective was to find if each 




2.3.1 DATA CONFIGURATION 
 The data were configured in two ways [1]: (1) randomly injected with data from 
users outside the community of 50 (which approximate an incursion by a masquerader) 
and (2) each user crossed with every other user to compare the effects of every user 
acting as a “masquerader” against all other users. The first configuration is that employed 
by Schnonlau, hereafter referred to as the SEA configuration. Some of the contrasts 
between the first and the second configuration are (1) the first configuration provides a 
consistent set of intrusions against all users, which allows meaningful error analysis. (2) 
The second configuration samples a greater range of intrusive behavior.  
 
2.3.2 COMPARISON RESULTS FOR SEVERAL DETECTION SCHEMES 
 Six masquerade detection schemes were used on the dataset packed with 
“Masqueraders” and their results were compared in the review paper by Schonlau [2]. 
The investigators targeted a false-alarm rate of 1%. Most of the methods hit low hit rates 
(ranging from 39.4% to 69.3%) and high false alarm rates (ranging from 1.4% to 6.7%). 
The results were compared using cluster analysis and ROC curves. Their results are 
shown graphically in Figure 1. 
• Bayes 1-Step Markov. 
A single step transition from one command to the next [3] is the logic behind 
this detector. The observed transition probabilities should be consistent with 
the historical probabilities and this determined by the detector. The technique 
worked really well in terms of correct detections but failed badly with 
respect to the desired false alarm rate. 
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• Hybrid Multi-Step Markov. 
This technique is based on Markov chains and is due to Ju and Vardi [4]. The 
implementation of this model is toggled between a Markov model and a 
simple independence model, depending on the proportion of test data that 
was not observed in the training data. This method peaked highest in terms 
of performance among the methods tested. 
• IPAM. 
This detector like the Bayes 1-step Markov method is based on single-step 
command transition probabilities which are estimated from the training data. 
The Incremental Probabilistic Action Modeling (IPAM) was developed by 
Davison and Hrish [1.] for their work in predicting sequences of user actions. 
The result of this method is depicted in Figure 1 where it is compared with 
other methods. IPAM’s performances have not been satisfactory. 
 
• Uniqueness. 
 This method was developed by Schonlau and Theus [13]. Commands that are 
 not seen in the training set may indicate a masquerade attempt. In fact, the               
 less frequent a command is used by the Users, the more it is intrusive.  
 Uniqueness was relatively poor in performance when compared to other  
 methods but it was the only method that approached the target false alarm  




The method was developed by Lane and Brodley [5] and the results have 
been portrayed in figure 1. This method computes a similarity match 
between the most recently used commands and the user profile. With 
Schnlau’s dataset it was poor performer.  
• Compression 
This method was built under the belief that new data would compress at the 
same ratio as the old data from the same user, and that data from a 
masquerading use will compress at a different ratio, and hence we could 
distinguish between the proper and the masquerader. This idea was 




Comparison of results of different Detection Schemes 
Figure 1. Compression was the worst performer of all these methods [2]. 
We now discuss the comparison results of different intrusion detection techniques as 
shown in the above figure. The curve or the arc formed by the X-axis and the Y-axis is 
called the ROC curve (Relative Operating Characteristic curve). The X-axis represents 
the percentage for the number of Hits and the Y-axis represents the percentage for the 
number of false alarms.   
 
10
2.4 SPLICING OF SESSIONS 
 
Figure 2 [1] Splicing of sessions. 
 
The above figure shows how splicing is done with the datasets. Each user has a dataset of 
15,000 commands and in turn we split the commands into sessions of 100 each. Hence 
we have 1 – 50 sessions in the training set and 51 – 150 sessions in the Testing Data. 
Furthermore we have a couple more users which are classified as masqueraders and they 
do not belong to the community of the 50 users (51 - 70). They choose a couple of test 
sessions from these Masqueraders and intersperse within the test data with a certain 
probability. This entire process is called splicing of sessions. There are certain rules that 
we need to follow while we do the splicing of sessions. 
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The EM algorithm is used to assign probabilities to the newly unidentified sessions 
from the test session data [7]. There is a good reason for using the EM algorithm. We do 
not want the classifier to classify each session in a greedy way rather we would like to 
classify it after enough sessions for a good classification has been recorded. Basically, we 
apply the log-likelihood function to the existing probabilistic model. Conclusively our 
aim would be to maximize the log-likelihood function in the presence of incomplete data. 
The theory behind our approach and a brief summary of the Bag-of-words model is 
discussed below. 
 
2.5 BAYESIAN APPROACH 
2.5.1 CLASSIFICATION THEORY 
 
Examples of normal behavior of users are available in plenty in different datasets 
but the intrusive behavior is hard to collect. This is because these kinds of datasets are 
very confidential or hard to capture. Similarly, in relation to masquerading sessions, 
many examples of proper sessions are available. Masquerading sessions in the training 
data are not known and moreover, masquerading sessions in the test data are expected to 
be rare. 
 Traditionally, all the proper sessions in the training data are collected to form the 
proper User model. The proper sessions of all other users from the training data are taken 
to form the Masquerader model for the current user. This approach would be quiet 
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effective with our dataset since all the masquerading sessions have been formed from the 
proper sessions of other users. Further, all new test sessions are compared against the 
profiles for the proper user model and the masquerader model. The anomaly detection 
problem has been transformed into a classification problem over the Proper user class and 
the artificially created Masquerader class. This transformation has allowed many 
powerful techniques from the Classification theory to be applied on the anomaly 
detection problem.  
 Even in a more general context of anomaly detection, the profile of the proper 
sessions is defined not only by the proper sessions, but also by the sessions of other users 
[3]. The extent of the proper profile in feature space is most naturally defined through 
both the proper cases and the intruder cases [3]. From the above, we see how beneficial 
this transformation for the anomaly detection problems is. 
 
2.5.2 BAG-OF-WORDS MODEL 
 The Bag of words model is one of the most widely used model in Information 
Retrieval (IR). The actual Text document is broken down into bag of words and we just 
keep track of the occurrences of each word rather preserving the sequence of the words. 
In other words we completely ignore the sequence information of the Text document. For 
classification of text documents, this simple model often performs better than more 
complicated models involving sequence information. Let C = {1, 2… n} be set of all 
possible commands and ‘n’ is the last command in the set. In reality, all the commands 
that form the text document are broken into small groups of equal length called sessions. 
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Hence a session number‘s’ is a finite sequence Cs = (Cs1, Cs2, Cs3, ….., Cszs) of
commands. In other words Cs is a sequence of commands with length ‘zs’. 
 As demonstrated in [1], the bag of words model outperforms many more complicated 
models attempting to take advantage of the sequence information. In particular, the 
techniques reviewed in [2] and earlier techniques based on a Markov model of command 
sequences achieved worse results. 
 
2.5.3 GENERAL THEORY 
 We have examined the log files of different user accounts at the Solaris Computer 
Lab of Oklahoma State University. These log files were collected from different user 
accounts logged on to the a.cs.okstate.edu server. Each Log file consists of different 
records based on the attributes that are fed as input to the system. In fact, every User has 
his own unique style of expressing or talking to the system. Different attributes of the log 
file can be considered as different levels of monitoring a system. Previous researchers 
have considered only “COMMAND” level. In our work we would develop a combination 
of the online and offline classifier with a trust node and consider the CPU time as another 
parameter which increases the level of surveillance. Some of the parameters available are 
Command, CPU time, User ID, Date & time of login. Later in this paper we define each 
of these fields. Moreover, each record or entry in the Log file represents or contributes to 
a part of the complete behavior for that User. 
 Each parameter or field in our dataset can be looked up on as different levels of 
monitoring. The first level of monitoring is the Command level and this can be extended 
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to different levels of monitoring by considering the rest of the attributes. Each User has a 
unique role or behavior to play in an organization. Therefore he would have access to 
only a certain type of commands. This belief helps us to visualize a unique pattern for 
every proper user in the Organization. The interloper or the “improper user commands” 
may comprise read or write access to private data, acquisition of System privileges, 
installation of malicious software etc. Hence the pattern produced by the improper user is 
way different from that of a proper user. To detect these intruders, behaviors of proper 
user are recorded and any deviant behaviors are considered as intrusions. An anomaly-
based intrusion detection technique is followed in this approach. Some of the common 
types of UNIX commands used in our data set are, 
• File Management.  
• Comparison and searching commands. 
• Text processing. 
• Shell and other programming. 
• Communications. 
• Storage commands. 
• System status. 








The dataset was prepared from the log files of different users that logged in to the 
Computer Science Administrative Server (a.cs.okstate.edu). Most of the UNIX 
commands and some additional fields were captured into a dataset. We used the 
“lastcomm” command to generate the data and later ran a script file. The syntax used to 
generate the list of a particular commands typed by the user is <lastcomm> <userid>. 
This gives the commands in the reverse order and the file is updated at 2AM every day. 
Well, the server running on the UNIX environment generates an accounting file or the 
log file for different users logged each day. In reality, the “lastcomm” command access 
these log files of different users to generate the data for different users. The command 
gives us information on previously executed commands. And with no arguments the 
“lastcomm” displays information about all the commands recorded during the current 
accounting file’s life time. If called with arguments, “lastcomm” displays accounting 
entries with a matching command-name, user-name, or terminal name.
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3.2 FEATURES OF ”lastcomm” COMMAND 
 
For each process entry, “lastcomm” displays the following items of information. 
• The command name under which the process was created. 
• One or more flags indicating special information about the process. The flags 
have the following meanings: 
F - The process performed a fork but not an exec. 
S - The process ran as a set-user-id program. 
• The name of the User who ran the process. 
• The terminal which the User was logged in at the time (if applicable). 
• The amount of CPU time used by the process (in seconds). 





4.1 BAYESIAN CLASSIFICATION 
 Bayesian Classifiers are developed to predict class membership probabilities, such 
as the probability that a given sample belongs to a particular class. Previous studies have 
found a simple Bayesian classifier known as the naïve Bayesian classifier to be 
comparable in performance with decision tree and neural network classifiers [11]. 
Bayesian classifiers have also exhibited high accuracy and speed when applied to large 
databases. Naïve Bayesian classifiers assume that the effect of an attribute value on a 
given class is independent of the values of the other attributes. This assumption is called 
class conditional independence. Surprisingly, good performance is exhibited in many 
domains that contain clear attribute dependences [8]. 
 
4.1.1 BAYES THEOREM 
 Let X be a data sample whose class label is unknown. Let H be some hypothesis, 
such as the sample X belongs to some type of class C. Here we have to determine P 
(H|X), the probability that the hypothesis H holds true for the data sample X. In other 
words P (H|X) can be defined as the posterior probability, of H conditioned on X. P(H) is 
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called the Prior probability of H. The posterior probability, P (H|X), depends on 
additional knowledge but the prior probability P (H) is independent of data sample X. 
Similarly we could define P (X|H) as X conditioned on H. 
 We use the Bayes theorem to calculate these probabilities. 
 P (H|X) = P (X|H) P (H)  / P(X) 
 
4.1.2 NAÏVE BAYESIAN CLASSIFICATION 
 
The Naïve Bayesian classifier or the Simple Bayesian classifier works as follows 
 1)  The data sample X is represented by a n-dimensional vector X = (x1, x2… xn)
and this has been contributed by n different attributes such as A1, A2… An.
2)  Let us consider that there are m classes, C1, C2… Cm. We also have a given  
 Sample, X, for which the Naïve Bayes classifier would assign the unknown       
 Sample X to the class Ci if and only if 
 P (Ci | X) > P (Cj | X)  for 1  ≤ j ≤ m,  j ≠ i. 
 This is known as maximum posterior hypothesis. Hence by Bayes  
 Theorem, 
 
P (Ci | X) = P (X | Ci) P (Ci) / P (X) 
 3)  Apparently P(X) is a constant value for all classes and hence we need to maximize     
P (X | Ci) P (Ci). Now if the prior probabilities of the classes are not known we 
assume that prior probabilities are equally likely, such as P (C1) = P (C2) …. = P 
(Cm) and hence we need to maximize P (X | Ci). Otherwise we maximize P (X | 
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Ci) P (Ci). We estimate P(Ci) = Ti / T, where Ti is the total number of training 
samples of class Ci and T is the total number of training samples. 
4) It would be extremely computationally expensive to compute P(X | Ci) when we   
have datasets with many attributes. In order to reduce this complexity, we make 
the assumption of class conditional independence. We mean that the values of the 




P (X  | Ci) =Π P (xk | C i)
k=1 
 
The probabilities P (x1 | Ci), P (x2 | Ci)… P (xn | Ci) can be estimated from the 
training samples. 
 P (xk | Ci) = Tik / Ti, where Tik is the number of training samples of class 
Ci having the value xk for Ak and Ti is the number of training samples belonging 
to Ci.
5) In order to classify an unknown sample X, P (X | Ci) P (Ci) is evaluated for each  
Class Ci. Sample X is then assigned to the class Ci if and only if 
 P (X | Ci) P (Ci) > P (X | Cj) P (Cj) for 1  ≤ j ≤ m,  j ≠ i. 
The objective of the Thesis is: 
(1) To simulate an Online and an Offline Bayesian classifier which toggles around    
 an optimal Trust Value. 
(2) Increasing the accuracy of the Probabilistic Model (Online and Offline Classifier)   
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by the addition of a parameter (“CPU time”) and hence increasing the level of 
monitoring. 
 
Previous Research  
(1) In the past, they have used only one type of classifier and here we have a 
combination of two classifiers which work simultaneously on the dataset. 
(2) Previous Researchers have used a different dataset with only one field (i.e.) 
“Command” and arrived at an Accuracy Rate. But in My research, I have 
prepared dataset with different fields such as “Commands”, “CPU Time”, “Date 
and Time of Login”, “UserID” but the level of monitoring would be through the 
commands and the CPU Time. 
 
4.2 PROPOSED APPROACH 
This section would be followed by a brief description of the dataset and our proposed 
algorithm in detail. The simple Naïve-Bayes classifier is perhaps the most widely studied 
classifier and is the Bayes-rule classifier for the bag-of-words model. By Bayes inversion 
formula, the posterior probability P(u|cs) of user ‘u’ given the sequence cs is, 
 P(T) = P(u|cs) * P(u|cput) 
Here P(T) is the Total probability which includes both the command and the CPU Time. 
‘cput’ is the CPU Time and also, 
 P(u|cs) = P(cs |u) P(u) / P(cs) which is directly proportion P(cs |u) P(u). 
 zs C
P(cs |u) =   Π P(csk |u)  = Π pnsc 
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k=1 k=1     uc
where nsc is the total count of command c in session s. 
Table 1: Dataset for User 1. 
 
COMMAND CPU time (secs) 




4999 biffmsg  0.08 






10000 Lynx 0.04 
…
.
15000 scan 0.02 
Brief Overview of the Dataset: 
 Data sets for 10 users were created and each User had 15,000 records in it. A sample 
framework of the Dataset for user 1 is shown in Figure 1. Every User Dataset has the 
1st 5000 
Commands 




from the Test 
set. 
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same structure as above. Let us now consider the dataset for USER 1. We now build 2 
Models from the Training Set, one is the proper User model and the other the improper 
User or the Masquerader. The Proper User Model is build from the training set of USER 
1 which consists of 5000 Records. The Masquerader Model is built by taking 550 
commands each from the training dataset of USER2 – USER10. Hence (9 * 550 = 
(approx) 5000). 
 So now we have the proper User model and the Masquerader Model for USER1. 
Also, we need to test this Model by inputting the Test Dataset for USER1.  
 COMMAND CPU Time 
5001 procmail 0.02 
…
.
5100 biffmsg 0.08 
10001 formail 0.01 
…
.
10100 ksh 0.02 
…
.
14901 comp 0.01 
…
.
15000 more 0.01 
Table 2:  Test Session for User 1. 
 
As seen from the Figure 2, the test session of USER1 which starts from 5001 – 15,000 is 
divided into 100 test sessions (sub sessions, to be precise). Each test session has 100 
records in it. 
1st session which 
consists of 100 
records
100th session 



























2.2 ONLINE & OFFLINE NAÏVE-BAYES DETECTOR 
 
Figure 4. Online & offline naïve-bayes detector 
Let us now see how the Bayesian Detector works. The detector consists of an 
Online and an Offline classifier. Moreover, there is a trust node (it stores the trust value) 
in it. An over view of this detector can been seen in Figure 4.  
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Now we have the first Test Session (Test Session 1- which consists of 100 
records) coming to the Bayesian Network Detector. The Online and the Offline Classifier 
would start to work on the Test Session 1 simultaneously. 
 
4.2.3 TRUST MODEL 
 
The Total probability is the product of the probabilities of both the commands and 
the CPU time. Also, the probability of the time parameter can be considered as a 
weighted probability with the commands to give the total probability. The Online 
Classifier builds a Model and immediately classifies Test Session 1 as a Proper or a 
Masquerader Session. Meanwhile, the Trust Node calculates the trust value.  
Note: 
 The word trust value is different from Threshold Trust Value (TTV). 
Since we already classified the session on the Online Classifier and hence we get to know 
the Correct and the Incorrect Classifications.  
 
Trust Value = Correct Classifications / Total number of sessions classified. 
 
Initially the Trust Value for the Test Session 1 would be set to 1 but after the Test Session 
arrives at the Online Classifier and had been classified, the New Trust Value is ready to 
be calculated from the Correct and the incorrect classifications. Also we have a value 
called the Threshold Test Value (TTV) which is found out to be 0.7 by Trial and Error 
methods. 
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Why would we need a Threshold value?. The answer to this would be discussed 
shortly. Meanwhile, when Test session 1 has been classified by Online Classifier, the 
Offline classifier do not classify it immediately into Proper and Improper sessions as the 
Online, Instead it does calculate a probabilistic score for each test session. Remember, 
Every time each Test Session arrives at the Online Classifier, a new Trust Value is 
calculated for each session at the Trust Node. 
 Assume that a Test Session‘t’ arrives at the Online Classifier. The Online Classifier 
classifies it as a Masquerader or a Proper User. The Trust Node calculates the Trust 
Value for this Test Session t and supposedly the trust value equals 0.7 which is our TTV. 
Immediately the control is transferred to the Offline Classifier which generates a 
Probabilistic score for the Test Session t. In addition to this, it classifies each test session 
for example Test Session 1 - Test Session t with respect to the Probabilistic Scores for 
each session. Hence at the tth session the trust value equals the TTV and the Offline 
Classifier starts classifying each test session as a Proper or a Masquerader. The Model 
built using an Offline Classifier is more accurate and this Model replaces the Model build 
by the Online Classifier. 
 
4.2 PROPOSED ALGORITHM 
 
1) The training set for User ‘u’ is formed in a text file and this would be our data for 
forming the proper user model. Furthermore, the training dataset of other Users 
are prepared which finally contributes to the masquerader model. The complete 
training set is represented as R.
2) Another input for this algorithm would be the streamed sequence S of newly 
unidentified 100 test sessions. 
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3) An initial classifier model is built for the User ‘u’ with the training dataset R θ^0 
= (ε^0, p^0, p^’0). 
4) The Online and the Offline naïve-bayes algorithm work simultaneously as the test 
sessions streams in. 
5) The online classifier calls a function to generate the unique commands in the 
current test session and its occurrence rate.  
6) The probabilities of the unique commands are taken from training function and 
are used classify the session as proper or masquerader. 
7) Depending on the type of classification we calculate the new probabilities for the 
commands and update the corresponding vector. 
8) Meanwhile, the toggling factor is calculated to allow optimal toggling between 
the Online and the Offline classifier.  
9) If the toggling factor reaches a threshold value, the Offline starts classifying each 
session from the 1 to the current session when the control was switched to 
Offline. Let us see how the offline works. Also‘t’ is the session when the control 
was switched. 
10) Now we Iterate through all the 100 test sessions as t = 1, 2… 100 or S in the 
sequence. 
 
a) Initially we start the model as θ^t = θ^t-1 .
b) Here we try to simulate the working of the offline classifier. As each of 
the test sessions t = 1, 2, …., 100 comes in, we calculate the trust value 
and say for one particular ‘t’, the trust value calculated was not good and 
hence we repeat these tests for each test sessions until ‘t’, (i, e) 1,2…t.
Otherwise we continue with step c. 
 Here we use the Expectation-Maximization Algorithm to 
generate a probabilistic score for these unidentified test session s 
= 1, 2... t. Well, it has two steps, the E-step and the M-step. In 
the E-step, the Bayes inversion formula is used to calculate the 
new scores, 
 P (ls = 1| cs; θ^t), for s = 1, 2... t. 
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 M-step: The model θ^t is updated with the new scores. Hence, at 
this point the model has information of all sessions s = 1, 2... t 
and hence is considered more accurate than the Online classifier. 
c) E-M step is repeated for different iteration until the conditional variable 
reaches a threshold vale which should be less than 2.2 * 10-11 .
11)  The model at the Online Classifier is updated with this model θ^t. . 
12)  The algorithm is repeated for different test sessions from step 5.   
 
Finally, we have the model θ^S for the User ‘u’ built on the training set R and updated by 
the sequence S of sessions.
4.4 EFFECTIVENESS OF BAYESIAN CLASSIFIER 
 
Theoretically, Bayesian classifiers have the minimum error rate in comparison to all 
other classifiers. Various empirical studies of this classifier in comparison to decision tree 
and neural network classifiers have found it to be comparable in some domains. Bayesian 
classifiers are also useful in that they provide a theoretical justification for other 
classifiers that do not explicitly use Bayes theorem. 
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4.5 SIMULATION OF NAÏVE-BAYES ALGORITHM 
 
4.5.1 MACHINE ARCHITECTURE 
 
The Algorithm was developed on Pentium IV processor with 640 MB RAM, 80 
GB Hard Disk capacity. The Naïve-Bayes Detection algorithm was simulated using 
Visual C++ in a .NET environment. Most of the charts were developed using Microsoft 
Excel.  
 





First thing the algorithm does is to build the training knowledge. It calls the 
corresponding function to train the proper user dataset and the masquerader dataset. Each 
of these function collect the unique commands from the 2 datasets and calculates the 
probability of each command.  
 Probability of a command ‘c1’ in the proper dataset, P (c1 | u) = nuc1 / u 
Where ‘nuc1’ is the total number of command ‘c1’ in the proper user dataset u and 
‘u’ is the total number of commands in the proper user dataset. 
 Probability of a command ‘c1’ in the masquerader dataset, P’ (c1 | u) = nuc1 / u 
Where ‘nuc1’ is the total number of command ‘c1’ in the masquerader dataset u 
and ‘u’ is the total number of commands in the masquerader dataset. 
 Final Probability with command and CPU Time in the proper dataset, 
 P (F | u) = P (c1 | u)  *  P (T | u) 
 Final Probability with command and CPU Time in the masquerader dataset, 
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P’ (F | u) = P ‘(c1 | u) * P’ (T | u) 
 
4.5.3 TEST PHASE (ONLINE CLASSIFICATION) 
 Now that we have built the training probabilities of all unique commands from the 
proper and masquerader dataset, we need to classify the test sessions with these 
probabilities. The algorithm consists of an input function which reads each of the 100 test 
sessions. The algorithm uses the Online classifier along with the Offline to classify each 
test session. The online classifier identifies the unique commands in the current test 
session and calculates a value called ‘temporary’ by using the probability (prior 
probability) of each command obtained from the training knowledge. The temporary 
value decides if a command is typed by a proper user or masquerader. Let us say a 
command c1 appears thrice in the current session ‘s1’. 
 Temporary value for command c1 in the proper user dataset,  
 T (c1 | s1)  =  P (F | u)  * P (F | u) * P (F | u)…….(1) 
 P (F | u) = P (c1 | u)  *  P (T | u) 
 Where ‘P (c1 | u)’ is the probability of that command from the training of proper user 
data, ‘P (T | u)’ is the probability of the CPU Time from the training of proper user data. 
We calculate the maximum obtained CPU time and the probabilities are obtained by 
scaling other CPU time with reference to the maximum. ‘P (F | u)’ is the Final probability 
with both command and CPU time in the proper user data. 
Temporary value for command c1 in the masquerader dataset,  
 T ‘(c1 | s1)  =  P’ (F | u)  * P ‘(F | u) * P ‘(F | u)……(2). 
 P’ (F | u) = P ‘(c1 | u) * P’ (T | u) 
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Where ‘P’ (c1 | u)’ is the probability of that command from the training of 
masquerader data, ‘P’ (T | u)’ is the probability of the CPU Time from the training 
of masquerader data and ‘P’ (F | u)’ is the Final probability with both command 
and CPU time in the Masquerader data. 
If the temporary value for a command c1 in the proper user dataset is greater than the 
temporary value in the masquerader dataset we classify that command to be a proper user 
command otherwise it is classified as a masquerader. Hence these comparisons are 
repeated with all unique commands in the current test session. If the majority of the 
commands are proper we declare the test session as proper and masquerader otherwise. 
The temporary value for a command is not the new probability of the command in the 
current session. 
 New probability of the command c1 for the current session s1 in proper user 
dataset,  
P (c1 | u)  = (nuc1 + ns1c1)  / (Tu + Ts1)
Where ‘nuc1‘ is the number of occurrence of command c1 in the proper user dataset, 
‘ns1c1‘ is the number of occurrence of command c1 in the current session s1, ‘Tu ‘ is the 
total number of commands in the Proper user dataset and ‘Ts1’ is the total number of 
commands in the current session s1. This new probability is multiplied with new 
probability of CPU time to get the Final probability for the proper user data. 
 
New probability of the command c1 for the current session s1 in masquerader 
dataset,  
P’ (c1 | u) = (nuc1 + ns1c1)  / (Tu + Ts1)
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Where ‘nuc1‘ is the number of occurrence of command c1 in the masquerader 
dataset, ‘ns1c1‘ is the number of occurrence of command c1 in the current session s1, ‘Tu ‘
is the total number of commands in the masquerader dataset and ‘Ts1’ is the total number 
of commands in the current session s1. This new probability is multiplied with new 
probability of CPU time to get the Final probability for the masquerader data. The 
probability P (c1 | u) & P’ (c1 | u) are substituted in the above equation 1 & 2 to get the 
Total probability. 
 At this time, update the new probabilities of each command with the training 
probabilities in the corresponding vector. In our simulation program, we had two 
dynamic vectors which stored the training probabilities of each commands in the proper 
and masquerader dataset. Hence if the current session is a proper one, we update the 
Proper vector otherwise we update the masquerader vector.   
 The Toggling Factor is a value which decides to switch on the control to the 
Offline classifier.  
 
4.5.3.1 Toggling Factor 
 
This Factor plays a very significant role in the accuracy of the whole 
system. In our detection system we have the Online and the Offline 
working simultaneously. Moreover, we have a toggling factor which is 
calculated every time a new session is read. Why do we say the toggling 
factor is important?  The Online classifier classifies each command with 
the probabilities determined from the Training function. The training 
function calculates the probability of each command appearing in the 
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training dataset. If the Online does not find a probability for a command 
from the training function it assumes a small value ‘α’ that is initialized 
to 0.01.  Hence the knowledge or the classification results of the Online 
classifier may or may not be accurate. Now, let us see what the Offline 
classifier does. The Offline classifier comes into action only when the 
toggling factor is true and let us say that it was true at the ‘tth’ test 
session. In fact this classifier generates the probabilistic score for each 
session by considering all the cumulative probabilities for a command 
appearing in each session from 1 to t.  The Expectation-Maximization 
algorithm (EM) is used to calculate the probabilistic score for each 
session. The offline classifier when compared with the online is thus 
more accurate and trustworthy. Apparently, the probability of each 
command calculated by the Offline is also accurate. However, the 
Offline classifier cannot be used completely to classify all the test 
sessions since it can be too pricy with respect to the time consumed by 
the classifier. Hence it has to be used in combination with the Online. 
Furthermore, we could make the probabilities calculated by the offline 
available for the Online to classify the rest of the test sessions and thus 
we would save some time consumed by the whole algorithm. It is 
therefore clear   that the Offline cannot be used for every session which 
comes in to the detection system. However, if we do not use the offline 
at the right time we would not be able to improve the accuracy on the 
Online classifier. This right time is decided by the Toggling Factor. This 
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factor is calculated by repeated experimentation of the algorithm. From 
our dataset, we have decided that the Toggling Factor is the session 
number which is a multiple of 3. Hence for every session which is a 
multiple of 3 the offline function is called and the probabilities of 
different commands calculated by the offline are updated into the 
Online. From here the online classifies each session based on the 
updated probability.  
 
The toggling factor was chosen based on the accuracy result of 
the detection system. When the toggling factor was the session number 
with the multiple of 4, we had a hit rate of 80%. The hit rate decreased 
to 77% when the factor was set as a multiple of 5.  Similarly, hit rates 
were calculated for several toggling factors. The factor which gave the 
best results were chosen as the Toggling factor for the detection system 
and in our case toggling factor which was the multiple of 3 gave the 
optimal results and hence chosen. 
 
4.5.3.2 Scaling Factor or Threshold Value 
 
The Threshold Value or the Scaling Factor plays an important role in 
the Offline part of the Detection System. Probabilistic score for each test 
session is being assigned by the E-M Algorithm. The E-M algorithm has 
two steps involved in it. The first step is the Expectation mechanism 
where we calculate a value named as ’ls’. The variable ’ls’ is known as the 
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Indicator variable. The indicator variable stores a probabilistic value for a 
command which is the sum of the prior probabilistic value of that 
command in the proper user dataset and the masquerader user dataset. The 
variable is updated with a new value after the Maximization step for each 
iteration. After calculation of the indicator variable in the Expectation step 
we now use the Maximization step to calculate the final Probabilistic score 
for the command. Here we use all the information for that command by 
considering all the test sessions from 1 to t. This new value becomes the 
value that needs to be updated to the Indicator variable. Thus for a 
command we use the expectation step and the maximization step to 
calculate the final score and thus forming the first iteration. The iteration 
for that command is continued until we have reached an optimal score for 
that command. The final score of that command in the first iteration is 
used to calculate the indicator variable ’ls’ (Expectation step) of the 
command in the second iteration. Using this indicator variable we 
calculate the probabilistic score of the command in the Maximization step. 
This iteration is repeated until we reach our desired scores for that 
command. This desired score is achieved only when the loop exits by 
meeting the scaling factor. In other words, the iteration is continued until 
the condition variable reaches a particular value. With our dataset, the 
particular value which is otherwise known as the Scaling factor is 
calculated as 2.2 * 10 -11. We now describe how we calculate the condition 
variable. The absolute value of the command in the proper dataset is 
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calculated by finding the difference between the Initial and the final 
indicator variable value for that iteration. The absolute value of the same 
command in the masquerader dataset is calculated by finding the 
difference between the Initial and final Indicator variable for the same 
iteration. The condition variable is nothing but the sum of the squares of 
the absolute values for that command in the proper and masquerader 
dataset. We did run a number of iterations for different users to calculate 
this value and based on the accuracy results of these experiments we gave 
the scaling factor a value of 2.2 * 10 -11. Moreover, using this factor value 
we had the best accuracy results in terms of Hit rate, Missing alarms and 
False Alarms. 
 
4.5.4 TEST PHASE (OFFLINE CLASSIFICATION) 
 The working of the offline classification is explained briefly in the following 
subsection. As each test session comes in at the input function the offline classifier 
calculates a cumulative probability score using the E-M Algorithm (Expectation 
Maximization). The Expectation is nothing but the probability of the command 
determined by the Bayes inversion formula. 
 (7) 
 Also  is the cumulative prior probability of the command in the proper 
user dataset and  is the cumulative prior probability of the command in 
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the masquerader dataset. For the first iteration the training probabilities are used to 
initialize the cumulative prior probability vector. The new cumulative probability 
is stored in a variable. Next, we start with the Maximization step, 




where  is a small value assumed to be1.01, 
 is nothing but ,
denotes the total count of command c among proper sessions in the training                   
 set,  
 denotes the total count of all commands (1 to v) among proper sessions in the     
 training set, 
 
where, 
 is the indicator variable which stores the          
 cumulative probability value, 
 is the count of command c in the current  
 session 
 is nothing but value calculated for commands 1 to v. 
 
The above probability is updated with the command’s prior probability in a dynamic 
vector which is named as the cumulative probability vector for proper user dataset.  




where  is a small value assumed to be 1.01, 
 is nothing but ,
denotes the total count of command c among masquerader sessions in the  
 training set, 
 denotes the total count of all commands (1 to v) among masquerader sessions  
 in the training set, 
 
where, 
 is the indicator variable which stores the          
 cumulative probability value, 
 is the count of command c in the current  
 session 
 is nothing but value calculated for commands 1 to v. 
 
The above probability is updated with the command’s prior probability in a dynamic 
vector which is named as the cumulative probability vector for masquerader dataset.  
 The above E-M algorithm is repeated for different iteration until the scaling factor 
condition for that command is reached. The Final probability (P (F | u), P’ (F | u)) is 
obtained from the product of the probabilities of CPU Time and the command in a 
session. Finally, the probabilities are updated in the cumulative probability vector. 
 P (c1 | u) =
P (F | u) = P (c1 | u) * P (T | u) 
 P’ (c1 | u) =
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P’ (F | u) = P’ (c1 | u) * P’ (T | u) 
 
Now we have all the new probabilities calculated by the Offline classifier and we begin 
to classify each session. 
 
The Offline classification is done with a group of test sessions say from session 1 to 
session t (when the toggling factor condition is true). The temporary value is calculated in 
the Offline classifier just like we did in the online classifier. Each test session from 1 to t 
is classified against these new probabilities. Finally we update the new probabilities in 
the main Vector for the Online classifier to classify the rest of the sessions. This improves 
the accuracy of the whole system. 
 
4.6 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 The dataset was trained and tested using the above proposed algorithm. A brief 
























Figure 5 original classification for USER 1 
 
This classification is the truth which we already know in our case since we have 
the test data. The test sessions from 1 to 100 are taken on the X-AXIS and the probability 
from 0 to 1 are taken on the Y-AXIS. All the test sessions hitting the probability 1 are 
masquerade test sessions. Hence these analyses are based on the original truth and not 
results from the algorithm. 
 
4.6.1.2 Results from classifiers for different users 
The average of results of the Online & Offline Naïve-Bayes Classifier from User dataset 
1, 3, 5 and 9 are shown below. 
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Online Classifier with Commands only 
 
Figure 6 Online Classifier with Commands only  
 
Here we again have the test sessions in the X-axis and the probability on the Y-axis. The 
analysis is based on the User dataset 1. The Online classifier had a Hit rate of 70%. But it 
had a high false alarm rate of 24% and a 6% missing alarm rate.  
Online Classifier with Commands and CPU Time 
 
Figure 7 Online Classifier with Commands and CPU Time 
 
















Online Classifier with Commands 
















The above figure shows us the chart of the simulation results for the Naïve-Bayes Online 
classifier with Commands and CPU time. The chart shows us the classification of proper 
and masquerade sessions. Hit rate with this classifier was 72 %, the false alarm rate 
reduced by 2 %. Hence the performance of the classifier improved in terms of false alarm 
rate and hit rate.  
 
Online & Offline Classifier with Commands only 
 
Figure 8 Online & Offline Classifier with Commands only 
 
Now we allow the test sessions to be classified with the Naïve-Bayes Online and Offline 
classifier. The results have been expressed in the form of a chart as shown in figure. 
Again we have the test sessions on the X-axis and the Probability on the Y-axis. When 
compared with the Online classifier, we had better results with a hit rate of 85% and the 
False alarm rate reduced by 12%. Moreover, the recorded missing alarm rate was 3%. 
The overall performance was good with this classifier.  
 


















Online & Offline Classifier with Commands and CPU Time 
 
Figure 9 Online & Offline Classifier with Commands and CPU Time 
 
During the implementation of this classifier, we considered both the commands and the 
CPU time. The results have been depicted in the form a graph as shown in the figure. 
Session numbers are on the X-axis and the corresponding probabilities were taken on the 
Y-axis. The hit rate raised to 88% while the false alarm decreased by 3% and the missing 
alarm rate recorded a low of 3%. Comparatively, the performance of the Online & 
Offline Naïve-Bayes classifier performed better when we considered both commands and 
the CPU time. 
 
Online & Offline Classifier with 


















Online & Offline Classifier with 
















Figure 10 Online & Offline classifier with command and CPU time for USER 1 
The results for USER 1 have been shown in the above figure. The online & offline 
Naïve-Bayes classifier with commands and time was used to generate the results. A hit 
rate of 88% was recorded with a false alarm rate of 9% and a missing alarm rate of 3%. 
USER 3 
Online & Offline classifier with command and CPU 
















Figure 11 Online & Offline classifier with command and CPU time for USER 3 
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The results for USER 3 have been shown in the above figure. The online & offline 
Naïve-Bayes classifier with commands and time was used to generate the results. A hit 




The results for USER 5 have been shown in the above figure. The online & offline 
Naïve-Bayes classifier with commands and time was used to generate the results. A hit 
rate of 90% was recorded with a false alarm rate of 5% and a missing alarm rate of 5%. 
Online & Offline Classifier with commands and 





















Online & Offline classifier with commands and 
















Figure 13 Online & Offline classifier with command and CPU time for USER 9 
 
The results for USER 9 have been shown in the above figure. The online & offline 
Naïve-Bayes classifier with commands and time was used to generate the results. A hit 
rate of 87% was recorded with a false alarm rate of 10% and a missing alarm rate of 3%. 
 
4.6.1.3 ROC Curves 
 
Each user was trained and tested with the Online & Offline with commands only 
classifier and Online & Offline with commands & time classifier respectively. To 
evaluate the method’s success over the entire dataset, a ROC curve could be very useful. 


















Figure 14 ROC Curve 
 
From the above chart we infer that the online & offline with command and time classifier 
clearly out performs the online & offline with command only classifier. 
 
4.6.2 TIMING PERFORMANCE 
 
4.6.2.1 Online Classifier with Commands and CPU Time 
 
The online classifier classifies a test session immediately. If the session is proper 
the corresponding vector is updated and if it is masquerader the corresponding vector is 
updated. Experiments were conducted to find the time complexities between different 
classifiers. Each session going through the online classifier with commands and CPU 
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time took the least amount of time when compared to the sessions classified through 
other classifiers.  
 
Time taken to classify one session in the Online Classifier = 0.05 secs 
 Time taken to classify 100 test sessions in the Online classifier = 5 secs  
 
4.6.2.2 Offline Classifier with Commands and CPU Time 
 
The offline classifier classifies each session in a cumulative basis and there is no 
Toggling factor involved with this classification. After the 100 th session has arrived the 
classifier would have given the most accurate result. Each session going through the 
Offline Classifier with commands and CPU Time took the most amount of time when 
compared to the sessions classified through other classifiers. The time complexities are 
shown below. 
 
Time taken to classify one session in the Offline classifier = 2.3 secs 
 Time taken to classify 100 test sessions in the Offline classifier = 230 secs 
 
4.6.2.3 Online & Offline Classifier with Commands and CPU Time 
 
In the Online & Offline Classifier with Commands and CPU Time, the Online 
classifier uses the model or probabilities updated by the offline classifier to classify the 
rest of the sessions. The control to the Offline classifier is given by the Toggling Factor. 
This classifier was most effective when compared to the time and detection rate.   
 
Time taken to classify one session in the Online & Offline classifier = 1.3 secs 
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Time taken to classify 100 test session in the Online & Offline classifier = 130 secs 
 
Accuracy results & timing performance for different classifiers 
 












Online 72 22 6 0.05 
Online & 
Offline 
88 9 3 1.3 






 The Online and the Offline Bayesian classifier is more accurate than the Simple 
Naïve Bayes Classifier. A comparison result of the accuracy rate of the Online and 
Offline Bayesian classifier with that of the Simple Bayes Classifier shows that Online & 
Offline classifier had better accuracy results in terms of Hit rate, Missing Alarm rate and 
False alarm rate.  Moreover, the addition of another parameter namely the “CPU Time” 
increased the overall accuracy of the Model. We compared the Online & Offline 
classifier with “Command” as the only parameter against the classifier with both the 
“Command” and the “CPU Time” and found that the later had an accuracy rate of 88%. 
Most of the accuracy results have been shown in Table 3. Finally, in assessing the results 
of a Masquerader Detection System we would be really concerned with the trade-off 
between correct detections (hits or true positives) and false detections (false alarms, or 
false positives) of the different classifiers. Therefore it is often depicted on a receiver 
operating characteristic curve (called the ROC curve) where the percentages of hits and 
the false alarms are shown on the Y-axis and the X-axis, respectively.  From the ROC 
curve we infer that the Online & Offline classifier with commands and CPU Time 
outperformed the classifier with commands by a significant margin. 
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5.1 FUTURE WORK 
 Integration of a different algorithm other than the Naïve Bayes classifier with the 
Online and the Offline techniques can be one of the potential future researches. Also the 
Expectation – Maximization algorithm which uses the log likelihood to generate a 
probabilistic score can be replaced by other models. Addition of different parameters in 
the dataset could increase the accuracy of the model and thereby increasing the levels of 
surveillance. Finally, one may want to build a statistical learning model to calculate the 
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A Masquerader is a malicious user who tries to gain access or control of a 
system from a proper user. The objective of this thesis is to increase the accuracy of the 
existing Naïve-Bayes Algorithm for detecting Masquerade attempts. We have an Online 
and an Offline classifier. The Classifier used in our experiments is the Naïve-Bayes 
Classifier. Although the dataset is being learned by the Online and the Offline classifier 
simultaneously, the online classifier makes an instantaneous decision whereas the Offline 
makes it after a specified span of time.  
 We try to increase the accuracy of the detection system by increasing the number of 
parameters within the dataset and also by the introduction of a Toggling factor between 
the Online and the Offline classifiers. The Naïve-Bayes classifier builds a proper user 
model and an improper model from the training dataset. The Test sessions are classified 
against these models. The E-M Algorithm was used to generate a probabilistic score for 
the unidentified sessions in the testing phase. The dataset was prepared from the log files 
of different users that logged into the Computer Science Administrative Server 
(a.cs.okstate.edu) for Oklahoma State University. Experimental results demonstrate that 
the Online & Offline classifier with commands and the extra parameter namely the CPU 
time outperformed the Online & Offline classifier with commands in terms of both the 
false alarm rate and the hit rate.   
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